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Abstract
A significant percentage of online content is now published and
consumed via the mechanism of crowdsourcing. While any user can
contribute to these forums, a disproportionately large percentage of
the content is submitted by very active and devoted users, whose con-
tinuing participation is key to the sites’ success. As we show, people’s
propensity to keep participating increases the more they contribute,
suggesting motivating factors which increase over time. This paper
demonstrates that submitters who stop receiving attention tend to
stop contributing, while prolific contributors attract an ever increas-
ing number of followers and their attention in a feedback loop. We
demonstrate that this mechanism leads to the observed power law in
the number of contributions per user and support our assertions by an
analysis of hundreds of millions of contributions to top content sharing
websites Digg.com and Youtube.com.
1 Introduction
Websites allowing Internet users to produce, share, rate and classify content
have become increasingly popular in the last decade and now represent many
of the Internet’s most frequently visited pages1. The most successful of these
1http://www.alexa.com/topsites.
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efforts have experienced rapid growth and attained mainstream popularity,
while many others have stayed small or disappeared.
It has been observed that the distribution of the number of contribu-
tions per user in many popular peer production efforts follow a heavy-tailed
power law form, in which the most active users contribute a disproportion-
ately large percentage of the content [1]. Indeed, these active members often
demonstrate extraordinary devotion, contributing for many months or more
at an elevated rate, and are often responsible for much of the popular con-
tent. Their continuing participation is therefore critical to the success of a
peer production effort.
The power law distribution in contributions per user indicates that active
users are more likely to continue the more they contribute [1], suggesting
incentives which increase over time. In previous survey-based studies, users
cited motivations such as enjoyment, intellectual stimulation, idealism, and
a sense of belonging as important to why they participated [2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
While these factors no doubt carry weight in a complex way for many users
[7], it seems unlikely that they continue to strengthen after weeks or months
of contributing. And while status and recognition play a key role in some
intimate online communities [5, 6, 8, 9], they are less relevant in one-to-many
content-sharing forums which nevertheless display the same power law in the
distribution of contributions.
Getting attention paid to one’s contributions is a form of value [10]; people
are willing to forsake financial gain for it [11]. Attention was previously
shown to spur further contributions in video sharing [12] and blogging [13].
However, no attempt was made to account for social effects in how attention
was allocated among the various contributors in this work.
This paper addresses how attention and followers affect contributions
to peer production websites, and in particular how they motivate prolific
contributors to remain active for a long time. We first demonstrate a strong
correlation between lack of attention and users’ decision to stop contributing
in both Youtube.com and social news site Digg.com. Next, we show that
the more users contribute, the greater their following (as measured by their
number of digg “fans” or youtube “subscribers”), and the more attention
2
they tend to receive from these followers. Finally, we present a mechanism
incorporating these empirical findings which explains the observed power law
in the distributions of contributions per user. Taken together, our findings
suggest that the feedback loop of attention is an important ingredient in a
successful of a peer production effort because of its role in motivating devoted
contributors to persist.
2 Data
In order to test our theory we collected data from Digg.com and Youtube.com,
the foremost social news and video sharing websites respectively. In both
cases, users submit content that can be consumed by other users, either in
the form of a link to news stories (Digg) or a video (Youtube).2 In both
systems, attention is transparent and easily observable, and the users are
allowed to create “fan” links to other users so they can easily follow each
others’ contributions.
Digg lets its users share news stories they discover from the Internet
in the form of an URL. On this website each new submission immediately
appears on a repository web page called “upcoming stories”, where other
members can find it and, if they like it, add a “digg” to it. A so-called “digg
number” is shown next to each story’s headline, which simply counts how
many users have dugg the story in the past. If an upcoming story receives a
sufficient number of diggs within a certain time period, it will be lifted from
the pool of upcoming stories and be displayed on the front page, in which
case it is said to be “promoted” or become “popular”.3 A popular story
normally keeps accumulating diggs for a few more days, before it eventually
saturates (i.e. stops receiving diggs) [14]. The final digg number of a story
thus measures the total amount of attention it received in its lifetime.
Our first data set contains 2,676,160 stories submitted by 372,701 users
2In general, all users can see all items; Youtube does allow people to make their videos
private or password protected, but this service is rarely used in practice.
3The actual proprietary algorithm used to determine whether a story qualifies to appear
on the front page is more complex and will not be discussed in this paper.
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between Digg’s inception in December 2004 and January 3, 2008. A total
number of 59,853,763 diggs made on these stories, including their timestamps
and submitter IDs, were fully recorded.
We also collected data from Youtube.com, a popular website where users
can upload, view and share video clips. Similar to Digg, a “view count”
number is displayed next to each video’s title, measuring how many times
it has been watched. However, in contrast with digg numbers which always
saturate, this view count may increase ad infinitum [15].4 Our second data
set consists of 9,896,784 video uploads submitted by 579,470 Youtube con-
tributors between the website’s inception in February 2005 and May 1, 2008.
For each video we recorded its submission date, uploader ID and “final” view
count as of May 1, 2008.
As a counterpart of Digg’s “popular stories”, Youtube also advertises a
list of “promoted/featured videos” on its front page, which are chosen by the
website staffs based on their personal tastes instead of an objective algorithm.
Unfortunately in our data set we do not have the information which videos
have been promoted. Therefore in order to calculate the “popular ratio” as
we did for Digg, we had to resort to our own definition of “popular videos”.
We defined a video to be “popular” if and only if it received more than 10,000
views before May 1, 2007 when the data was collected, where 10,000 is the
mean and 90% quantile of all view counts in our data set. We also defined a
video to be “final” if it is the last upload of its contributor and was uploaded
three months before the data collection time (i.e. uploaded before February
1, 2008).
4There are at least two reasons why the digg number of news stories saturates but the
view count of videos does not. First, videos are not as time-sensitive as news stories, so
their novelty decays more slowly. Second, people search for videos on Youtube but browse
through news stories on Digg, so it is easier to discover vintage videos than vintage stories.
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3 The active core and decreasing stopping
probability
We previously mentioned that a disproportionate number of contributions
to online peer production efforts are made by a small number of very ac-
tive users. This is true of Digg and Youtube as well. As demonstrated in
Fig. 1, the distribution of the number of contributions per user exhibits a
heavy power-law tail. In this figure we include only those users who seem
to have become inactive, by not contributing for at least T months before
the date of data capture, in order to accurately represent the “final” number
of contributions for users. Of course, it is impossible to ascertain whether
a given user has truly stopped or is merely taking an extended break, but
in practice there may not be a large difference between these two states in
terms of the user’s morale and motivation. We selected T = 3 in creating
these plots; other choices produce similar results.
The power law in number of contributions per user is of interest in our
context not only because it indicates the presence of an active core of par-
ticipants, but also because of what it implies about users’ motivation. Given
a large number of users, the proportion that stop after making their n’th
contribution is
P (stop after n) =
N(n)∫ nmax
n N(m)dm
,
where N(n) is the number of users making n contributions and then stopping
and nmax is some empirical maximum number of contributions. Empirically,
at the high end, N(n) follows a power law form, N(n) ∼ n−k with k > 1, so
therefore
P (stop after n) ∼ 1/n+ (n/nmax)−k+1.
We thus see that the probability a user stops contributing decreases the more
he contributes [1].
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Figure 1: Distribution of the the number of submissions (n) for (a) Digg and
(b) Youtube. The number of submissions follows a power-law distribution on
Digg, and has a long tail on Youtube. It is evident that while the majority
of users made relatively few contributions, there is also a considerable pro-
portion of users who contributed substantially. For example, in our data sets
3,381 Digg users submitted more than 100 news stories, and 12,171 Youtube
users uploaded more than 100 videos.
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4 Attention and the role of popularity
As an alternative to user-cited motivating factors listed above, we propose
that contributors to Digg and Youtube are motivated by attention. We first
provide empirical evidence of this, and then describe how attention a user
receives tends to keep increasing via a follower reinforcement mechanism,
thereby explaining the power law in contributions per user.
4.1 Lack of attention is correlated to stopping
If Digg contributors are motivated by attention, we would expect that story
submitters whose stories do not achieve popularity be more likely to stop
than others. Again, we use a threshold of 3 months of inactivity to demarcate
stopping; even if a user returns after a long hiatus, he most likely was quite
unmotivated during his time away. We thus chose the 30,157 users who
submitted no less than 5 stories before they stopped (i.e. submitted at least
5 stories before October 3, 2007 and had no activity since then till January
3, 2008, when our data was collected), and calculated the fraction of popular
stories among all the 30,157 n’th last stories, for n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. The result
is plotted in Fig. 2 as the green curve. As one can see more than 4% of all the
5th last stories eventually became popular, but only 2% of the last stories
had the same luck. This is consistent with our conjecture that a contributor
is more likely to stop when she fails to receive enough attention. To show
that our result is robust, we repeated the calculation for two more groups
of users who submitted no less than 10 and 20 stories in their lifetime. The
fraction of popular stories again exhibits declining trends for both groups, as
can be seen from the blue and red curves in Fig. 2.
We then calculated the popular ratio of all Youtube videos submitted in
each week of the year 2007 (denoted by r(t)), as well as the popular ratio
of all final videos submitted in the same weeks (denoted by rf (t)), where
popularity was defined in Section 2.5 Finally, we plotted the two sets of
5Because the view count of Youtube videos increases infinitely, late submissions gener-
ally receive less view counts than earlier ones. It no longer makes sense to plot the fraction
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Figure 2: Popular ratio versus reverse submissions index for Digg contribu-
tors. The horizontal axis marks the reverse index of a user’s submission, so
that −1 is her last submission, −2 is her second last submission, and so on.
The green, blue and red curves are calculated for those users who submitted
no less than 5, 10 and 20 stories in their lifetime, respectively.
ratios in Fig. 3. As one can see the final videos on average are less popular
than the other videos submitted in the same weeks, which is consistent with
our hypothesis that lack of popularity triggers cessation. A paired t-test of
the alternative hypothesis “rf (t) < r(t)” yields a p-value less than 0.001,
again supporting our hypothesis.
4.2 Attention tends to increase with the number of
submissions
The evidence presented above suggests a strong correlation between popu-
larity (attention received) and productivity (tendency to contribute). It is
of popular videos as a function of the video’s reverse submission index, as we did in the
study of Digg (Fig. 2). This is because one would not able to tell whether the final videos
received less view counts because they are less popular or simply because they have been
on the website for a shorter time. Hence it is only meaningful to compare the view counts
of videos submitted not far apart in time.
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Figure 3: The red circles in this figure represent the popular ratios of Youtube
videos submitted in each week of 2007. The blue squares represent the pop-
ular ratios of all final submissions made in the same weeks. As can be seen
most squares lie below the circles, indicating that the final submissions re-
ceived less attention than the earlier ones.
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thus natural to ask whether one could develop a model to predict a user’s
productivity from her popularity. Suppose that the amount of attention
each user receives from one submission is a random variable X. Consider for
benchmark purpose the following simplest stopping rule. If a contributor’s
latest submission surpasses some “successful” threshold θ (which may also
be random and may be a different random variable for each person) she will
continue to contribute, otherwise she will stop.6 Under these assumptions it
is straightforward to show that the number of user submissions n will follow
a geometric distribution: pn = p(1 − p)n−1 for n ≥ 1, where p = P (X > θ).
This, however, is at odds with the power-law distribution of user productivity
which exhibits a long tail.
The reason for this discrepancy lies in our assumption that the amount
of attention received by each submission is always drawn from the same
distribution, so that each submission has an equal chance to succeed. If we
assume instead that the attention received by each contributor is positively
reinforced as time goes on, then those who have been contributing for a
longer time will be more likely to obtain a “successful” status with their new
submissions, thus less likely to stop. Such a modification would lead to a tail
distribution of user submissions that is longer than the geometric tail and
closer to the power-law tail that has been observed on Digg, Youtube and
many other websites.
To verify this reinforcement theory we plotted the amount of attention
received by each submission as a function of the submission index, for both
Digg and Youtube. The results are shown in Fig. 4. It can be seen that the
received attention X grows more or less proportionally with the submission
index n, which confirms the existence of attention reinforcement. Mathe-
matically, we can write X = anY where a is a positive constant and Y is
a multiplicative noise with mean one.7 Assuming the same stopping rule as
before, a new submission with index n will fail to be successful with prob-
6A more realistic model would assume that a user’s stopping probability depends not
only on the popularity of her last submission but also on her earlier ones. This will not
change the following discussion in a fundamental way.
7We assume multiplicative noise instead of additive noise because there is empirical
evidence that attention growth is a multiplicative process [14].
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Figure 4: The amount of attention received by each submission as a function
of the submission index. The n’th point in each figure plots the average
amount of attention (digg number or view count) received by all submissions
whose index lies between 20(n−1) and 20n, right inclusive. In plotting (a) we
made use of the full Digg data set with the removal of four contributors who
had abnormally many fans. They are ObamaforAmerica (Barack Obama,
9896 fans and 49 submissions), teamhillary (Hillary Clinton, 1305 fans and
14 submissions), Gravel08 (Mike Gravel, 2609 fans and 3 submissions), and
jayadelson (Jay Adelson, CEO of Digg, 1956 fans and 40 submissions). In
plotting (b) we filtered out all videos submitted in January 2007 from the
Youtube data set (c.f. footnote 5).
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ability P (anY < θ) = P (aY/θ < 1/n). Let F be the CDF of the random
variable aY/θ. We see that a contributor who made n past submissions will
stop at n with probability
F
(
1
n
)
= F (0) +
F ′(0)
n
+O
(
1
n2
)
=
F ′(0)
n
+O
(
1
n2
)
, (1)
where F ′(0) is a positive constant. Suppose the number of contributions
in the population follows a distribution pn, or equivalently, a fraction pn of
contributors stop at n contributions. Using this notation and ignoring the
higher-order terms for large n, Eq. (1) can be written as
pn
pn + pn+1 + · · · =
F ′(0)
n
. (2)
Defining G(n) = pn + pn+1 + · · · and approximating G(n) with a continuous
function, we have
− G
′(n)
G(n)
=
F ′(0)
n
. (3)
The solution to this equation is G(n) ∼ n−F ′(0), which implies that pn =
−G′(n) ∼ n−F ′(0)−1. We have thus shown that the number of contributions
has a power-law tail, in accordance with the empirical observations.
4.3 Attention is reinforced by one’s followers
While our reinforcement theory offers a tentative explanation for the long tail
distribution of user contribution, it does not tell us why such reinforcement
exists. It is possible that the contributors learn by experience what is favored
by the general population and adapt their contributions to the popular de-
mand. This would explain why later submissions have higher popularity, but
not the linear dependency (Fig. 4). To answer this question one needs to
look into the constituents of a contributor’s potential audience.
As a matter of fact, previous empirical studies have shown that the ma-
jority of diggs received by a Digg story in the upcoming phase (i.e. before
it is promoted to the front page) come from the contributor’s “fans”. This
12
is due to the fact that Digg implemented a social filtering system that al-
lows its users to designate other users as “friends” and easily track friends’
activities [16]. When a contributor submits a story to Digg, her fans (those
who designated the contributor as friend, also called “reversed friends”) can
discover the story through a friend interface and digg it if they like it. On
Youtube there is a similar “subscription” mechanism that allows its users to
subscribe to other users’ videos. When a contributor releases a new video it
immediately become visible to her fans (those who subscribed to her videos)
through a subscription interface.
Because a considerable portion of attention a contributor receives can be
attributed to her fans, the contributor’s publicity (measured by the number
of fans) could act as the important missing link between popularity and pro-
ductivity. A contributor with many past contributions (high productivity)
naturally has many fans (high publicity). Her fans naturally pay a lot of at-
tention to her next contribution (high popularity). This in turn incentivizes
the contributor to make more contributions (higher productivity), thereby
closing the reinforcement loop.
To test the role of publicity we recorded the fan number of each contrib-
utor in our Digg data set on January 3, 2008. We then tracked the digg
number of all stories submitted in the next two weeks (between January 3,
2008 and January 17, 2008). A total number of 145,081 such stories were
submitted by 30,341 contributors. Fig. 5(a) plots the contributors’ publicity
(number of fans on January 3) as a function of their productivity (number
of contributions before January 3), and Fig. 5(b) plots their popularity (fi-
nal digg number of each new contribution submitted between January 3 and
January 17) as a function of their publicity. It can be seen from the two fig-
ures that a contributor’s popularity is roughly proportional to her publicity,
which in turn is roughly proportional to her productivity. Summarizing the
two results, this explains why popularity grows linearly with productivity,
which is what we found from Fig. 4(a).
We next performed a similar measurement on Youtube. On February 7,
2008 we recorded the subscription number of each contributor in our Youtube
data set. A total number of 86,620 contributors submitted 260,002 videos in
13
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Figure 5: We recorded the digg number of all 145,081 stories submitted by
30,341 Digg contributors between January 3, 2008 and January 17, 2008,
as well as the contributors’ fan number on January 3, 2008. (a) Publicity
(number of fans) as a function of productivity (number of past contributions).
The n’th data point plots the average fan number of those contributors who
submitted 2n−1 ≤ m < 2n stories before January 3, 2008. (b) Popularity
(digg number) as a function of publicity (number of fans). The n’th data
point plots the average digg number of all stories whose contributor had
2n−1 ≤ m < 2n fans on January 3, 2008.
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Figure 6: We recorded the view count of 260,002 videos submitted by 86,620
Youtube contributors between February 7, 2008 and February 21, 2008, as
well as the contributors’ subscription number on February 7, 2008. (a) Pub-
licity (number of subscribers) as a function of productivity (number of past
contributions). The n’th data point plots the average subscription number
of those contributors who uploaded 2n−1 ≤ m < 2n videos before February
7, 2008. (b) Popularity (digg number) as a function of publicity (number of
subscribers). The n’th data point plots the average view count of all videos
whose contributor had 2n−1 ≤ m < 2n subscribers on February 7, 2008.
the following two weeks (between February 7, 2008 and February 21, 2008).
We plotted the average subscription number of these contributors as a func-
tion of their past productivity (Fig. 6(a)), and also plotted the average view
count each contributor received in the two studied weeks as a function of
their subscription number (Fig. 6(b)). Again we observed proportionality in
both figures.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that attention is a likely motivating factor for
the active core of participants to two popular peer production websites. Fol-
lowers affect contributions to peer production websites, and motivate prolific
contributors to remain active for a long time. We demonstrated a strong
correlation between lack of attention and users’ decision to stop contributing
in both youtube.com and social news site digg.com. We then showed that
the more users contribute, the greater their following (as measured by their
number of digg “fans” or youtube “subscribers”), and the more attention
they tend to receive from these followers. Finally, we presented a mechanism
incorporating these empirical findings which explains the observed power law
in the distributions of contributions per user. Taken together, our findings
suggest that the feedback loop of attention is an important ingredient in a
successful of a peer production effort because of its role in motivating devoted
contributors to persist.
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